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Abstract
The temporal nature of modeling accounts as nodes and transactions
as directed edges in a directed graph – for a blockchain, enables us to
understand the behavior (malicious or benign) of the accounts. Predic-
tive classification of accounts as malicious or benign could help users of
the permissionless blockchain platforms to operate in a secure manner.
Motivated by this, we introduce temporal features such as burst and at-
tractiveness on top of several already used graph properties such as the
node degree and clustering coefficient. Using identified features, we train
various Machine Learning (ML) algorithms and identify the algorithm
that performs the best in detecting which accounts are malicious. We
then study the behavior of the accounts over different temporal granular-
ities of the dataset before assigning them malicious tags. For Ethereum
blockchain, we identify that for the entire dataset - the ExtraTreesClas-
sifier performs the best among supervised ML algorithms. On the other
hand, using cosine similarity on top of the results provided by unsuper-
vised ML algorithms such as K-Means on the entire dataset, we were able
to detect 554 more suspicious accounts. Further, using behavior change
analysis for accounts, we identify 814 unique suspicious accounts across
different temporal granularities.
Index terms— Blockchain, Machine Learning, Temporal Graphs, Behavior
Analysis, Ethereum, Suspect Identification
1 Introduction
A Blockchains is an ever-growing large directed temporal network with more
and more industries starting to adopt it for their businesses. In permissionless
blockchains, interactions (also called as transactions) happen between different
types of accounts. In Ethereum mainnet public blockchain, these accounts can
be either Externally Owned Accounts (EOA) or Smart Contracts (SC ). Here,
transactions from an EOA (called as an external transaction) are recorded on
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the blockchain ledger whereas transactions from an SC (called as an internal
transaction) are not recorded on the ledger.
With actual money involved in most of the permissionless blockchains, an
account must be able to perform secure transactions. Recently, many security
threats to various blockchain platforms have been identified [1]. For some identi-
fied vulnerabilities, counter-measures have been implemented. We do not delve
into surveying all the security threats. In [2], the authors survey security flaws
that exist in Ethereum blockchains. In many of the security vulnerabilities iden-
tified in Ethereum blockchain, hackers target other accounts by either hacking
SCs or implementing malicious SCs for cybercrimes such as ransomware, scams,
phishing, and hacking of exchanges or wallets [3].
With an ever-increasing growth and adoption of blockchain technology by
the industry and the crypto-currency market, permissionless blockchains are at
the epicenter of increased security vulnerabilities and attacks. Our motivation
for this work is based on the fact that there is limited work on learning the
behaviors of the accounts in permissionless blockchains which are malicious
and potentially victimize other accounts in the future. In short, we aim to
identify malicious accounts so that the potential victims and blockchains can
deploy counter-measures. In this paper, henceforth, we use term blockchain to
represent permissionless blockchain. The techniques proposed in related studies
classify accounts as malicious using either machine learning (ML) algorithms
or motif-based (basic building subgraphs of a network) methods. Nonetheless,
the features used by the available techniques are: (a) limited and not learned
from the previous attacks on blockchains, and (b) extracted from the aggregated
snapshot of time-dependent transaction graphs that do not consider temporal
evolution of the graphs.
The temporal aspects attached to the features are essential in understand-
ing the actual behavior of an account before we can classify it as malicious.
For example, inDegree and outDegree features are time-variant and should be
considered a time series. Nonetheless, it has been proven that the aggregated
node degree distribution for accounts follows a power-law in blockchains such as
Ethereum [4]. Here, questions that we ask are: does such behavior exist in all
accounts? Is there a burst of degree for certain accounts at certain instances and
can the existence of such bursts be used to identify malicious activity? To an-
swer these question, we first identify the existence of bursts. Then to study the
effect of bursts, we introduce features such as temporal burst, degree burst,
balance burst, and gasPrice burst.
The fat-tailed nature of power-law degree distribution also gives rise to
neighbor-hood-based fitness preferential attachment in blockchains [5]. In [5]
authors defined fitness as “the ability of the node to attract new connections”
and showed that the accounts that have high fitness sometimes are short-lived
and indulge mostly in malicious activities while when they are long-lived they
represent large organizations. Here, the authors define the fitness factor consid-
ering one previous time instance interactions. As it does not consider a temporal
window, one drawback of the method lies in its ability to correctly classify mali-
cious transactions that appear at an interval of 2 time units or more. Inspired by
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this, we define a neighborhood-based feature called attractiveness that takes
into account a temporal window of size θa where (0 < θa < TDS) and TDS is
the duration for which we collect the dataset (DS). Our attractiveness measure
takes into account the stability of directed transactions that happened between
two accounts in the past. Intuitively, a malicious account will have high attrac-
tiveness as it will tend to transact with new accounts while benign accounts will
have high neighborhood stability or low attractiveness.
As the behavior of an account can change from malicious to benign or from
benign to malicious over time, there is a need for continuous monitoring and
analysis of the real-time transactions given the history of transactions performed
by an account. We thus study the evolution of malicious behavior over different
timescales by creating sub datasets and then answer would a certain account
show malicious behavior in future? Towards this, we first apply different ML
algorithms and identify the most suitable unsupervised ML algorithm in the
entire dataset that is able to cluster accounts most accurately. Then we apply
the identified algorithm to different sub datasets within a temporal scale to
capture the behavior changes.
In summary, following are our main contributions:
• Feature Engineering : We identify feature vector for identifying malicious
accounts based on previous attacks on blockchains and perform time
series analysis. As new features, we propose temporal burst, degree burst,
balance burst, gasPrice burst, and attractiveness.
• Comparative analysis: We perform a comparative study with tech-
niques proposed in related studies and identify best possible supervised and
unsupervised ML algorithm with related hyperparameters when we use
Ethereum transaction data.
• Results: Our results demonstrate that ExtraTreesClassifier performs best
with respect to balanced accuracy under supervised settings for the entire
dataset while when using clustering techniques, we are able to identify 554
more suspect accounts. Analysis of behavioral changes reveal 814 suspects
across different temporal granularities.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present back-
ground and the state of the art techniques for identifying malicious accounts
and compare them. In sections 3 and section 4, we present detailed description
of our methodology and the feature vector, respectively. This is followed by
in-depth evaluation along with the results in section 5. We finally conclude in
section 6 providing details on prospective future work. Further, in Table 1 we
provide list of acronyms used in the paper.
2 Background and Related Work
There are two types of blockchain technologies, permissionless and permis-
sioned. The major difference between two technologies is that in permissioned
3
Acronym Meaning Acronym Meaning
EOA Externally Owned Account CC Clustering Coefficient
SC Smart Contract Bal Balance
ML Machine Learning TF Transaction Fee
AS Active State BB Burst
iD inDegree IET Inter-Event Time
oD outDegree A Attractiveness
PoW Proof of Work LOF Local Outlier Factor
EVM Ethereum Virtual Machine
Table 1: List of Acronyms.
blockchain prior access approval is needed for performing any action on the
blockchain while in permissionless blockchain anyone can perform actions on
the blockchain without any approval. Further, there is no way to censor anyone
from permissionless blockchains. Such aspects lead to more frauds and mali-
cious activities to prevail in permissionless blockchains. Ethereum and Bitcoin
use permissionless technology.
Ethereum was developed by Vitalik Buterin in 2013 [6] and allows users
to run programs in its trusted virtual environment known as Ethereum Vir-
tual Machine (EVM). These programs are called Smart Contracts (SC) and are
stored on the ledger along with transactions performed on a given fixed address.
Ethereum uses “Ether” as its native crypto-currency for transfer and transaction
fees. Smart Contracts can also send, store and receive ethers. Once deployed
it is a hard coded program that could only be fed with input to get output.
Smart Contracts are also used by some applications for their processing. Such
applications are called distributed applications or dapps. Although Ethereum is
known for its security and trust a small bug in SC code can cause huge loss [7]
of crypto-currency. Unlike Bitcoin, Ethereum uses list of accounts. For a valid
transaction, amount is transferred from sender to receiver. If receiver is a SC,
its code is executed and the state of the SC is updated. Internally, a SC could
send a message or perform internal transactions with other accounts. Ethereum
currently uses a refined form of PoW (Proof of Work) consensus algorithm.
PoW is computationally expensive and energy inefficient.
There are vast number of studies in fraud detection [8]. Nonetheless, tar-
geting Ethereum, Chen et al. [2] base their survey on attacks and defences in
Ethereum. We do not survey all the attacks and defense mechanisms in this
work. However, we provide an in-depth understanding of different methods
used to detect accounts involved in malicious activity. Several works have tried
to identify or categorize malicious accounts and activities in different types of
blockchains. As blockchains have graph structure, most of these techniques
study graph properties (such as node degree) to identify features before apply-
ing supervised or unsupervised learning.
In [9], authors used a bitcoin transaction network to detect malicious activ-
ity. They were able to detect three malicious attacks using unsupervised ML
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algorithms with a limited amount of available transaction data. In their followup
work, they used a more comprehensive bitcoin transaction dataset (starting from
genesis block until April 7th, 2013) [10]. They employed data in two types of
graphs namely User Graph and Transaction Graph. In user-graph nodes rep-
resent accounts and edges represent transactions, whereas in transaction-graph
nodes represent transactions and edges represent flow of bitcoins. They first
studied the flow of bitcoins to prove the existence of anomalies and then per-
formed clustering to identify different attacks. They were able to detect the
existence of one attack using the Local Outlier Factor (LOF). Inspired by [10],
in [11], Monamo et al. also used bitcoin transaction data and proposed an up-
date to counter scaling issues that are inherent in LOF. They validated their
approach using trimmed K-Means, argued its usefulness in detecting anomalies
and detected 5 out of 30 fraudsters.
In another bitcoin-related malicious activity detection [12], authors studied
the detection of addresses involved in the Ponzi scheme. They used supervised
learning and validated their results after addressing the class imbalance that
is inherent in any malicious activity related to datasets. They identified that
the Gini coefficient of outgoing values and the ratio between incoming and total
transactions are the most important features for detecting Ponzi scheme related
accounts. In another Ponzi scheme related study, in [13], authors use Ethereum
data to extract features from operation codes (opcodes) of the smart contract’s
bytecode. Their motivation behind the study was based on the fact that the
opcodes reflect logic implemented in a SC and therefore provide useful features
for identifying Ponzi and non-Ponzi SC. They also figured out that opcode
features are more efficient than account based features while detecting Ponzi
scheme accounts. In [14], authors use partial Ethereum transaction data to
classify malicious accounts. They also performed a sensitivity analysis to study
the effect of different classifiers on the feature set. In [15], to counter class
imbalance, authors assumed that accounts connected to malicious accounts via
incoming transactions are also malicious. They then studied various supervised
ML algorithms to identify malicious accounts over this over-sampled Ethereum
dataset. In a followup study of [15], in [16], authors used only those benign
accounts who have never transacted with malicious accounts. Due to this, their
feature vector has only transaction based properties but not the graph based
properties.
N-motifs are frequently occurring subgraphs that serve as a basic building
block of a network. Authors in [17] defined N-motif as a path of length 2N
between two entities where transactions are also considered as vertices. Using
N-motifs that are present in the transaction graph, in [17], authors studied
transactions happening between entities (people or organizations with multiple
accounts). They were able to correctly identify malicious accounts involved in
gambling. In another study [18], authors analysed transfer of funds within a
subnet and used temporal feature such as how quickly funds are cashed.
We present all the above-mentioned techniques in detail in Table 2 and
present the features that the techniques used along with studied ML algo-
rithm, their hyperparameters, accounts considered in the dataset and perfor-
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mance score. Note that all these techniques use features that are based on some
graph properties, transacting amount, and active state to train the ML model.
However, several other studies, such as [4, 19], use inferences drawn from the
analysis of the transaction graph to mark malicious accounts. In [4], authors
try to identify accounts indulging in DDos attack and argue that accounts that
create multiple rarely used contracts are malicious. A similar approach is fol-
lowed in [20] where they used only verified SC codes and introduced features like
SC size, lifetime and average time between transactions (i.e. Inter-event time).
In [19], authors deploy honeypot and analyze RPC requests to identify mali-
cious accounts. They then analyze transactions to mark accounts as suspicious
that accept crypto-currency from malicious accounts. They perform behavior
analysis to identify fisher accounts and attacks such as crypto-currency stealing.
All the above techniques either use a limited set of ML algorithms on a
highly scaled-down data inducing over-fitting or apply inferences on the graph
structure to identify malicious activities and accounts. In most cases, studies
use features that do not capture temporal behavior and are approximated by the
mean behavior, thereby, further inducing a bias in their study thus having high
accuracy. Techniques that use large datasets and have high class imbalance, on
the other hand, either have high recall and low precision or low recall and high
precision [14]. Nonetheless, using our features, we identified ML algorithm that
provides better precision as well as better recall.
3 Methodology
We use Ethereum mainnet blockchain transaction data and first validate our
assumptions and approach. We segment the transaction data into sub-datasets
(SD) to capture the behavioral changes. We create the SDs using different tem-
poral granularities (Tg such that Tg ∈ TG) where TG = {Day, Week, Month,
Quarter, HalfY early, Y ear, All}. A granularity becomes coarser as we move
from Day to Year. Here a SD in a Day consists of transactions of 6000 blocks.
The choice of 6000 blocks is based on the fact that in Ethereum approx 6000
blocks are created every day. At a coarser Tg, a SD in a Week consists of 7
Days data. Similarly, a SD in a Month consists of 30 Days data, a SD in a
Quarter consists of 3 Month data, a SD in a HalfYearly consists of 6 Months
data, and a SD in a Year consists of 12 Months of data.
On all the features that are time series based (features described in section 4),
we perform time series analysis of all the SDs at different Tg to quantify them
using tsfresh that “extracts characteristics from time series” [21, 22]. The anal-
ysis reveals that features such as quantile and median best describe the time
series for most of the features we have. We observe this behavior not only in
the entire dataset but also in different SDs at different Tgs.
We first apply the AutoML pipeline using TPOT [23] to identify the best
ML classifier on the entire dataset and validate state of the art techniques. We
configure TPOT with existing tested ML algorithms and their hyperparame-
ters. Note that TPOT internally performs imputation and feature scaling also.
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Nonetheless, as our aim is to detect malicious accounts, we also apply clustering
to identify accounts that show similar behavior to that of malicious accounts.
For the entire dataset, we find that K-Means provides best silhouette score for
k = 9 when we consider both EOAs and SCs. For clusters identified as ma-
licious, we use cosine similarity to quantify the similarity among the accounts
within the cluster. We acknowledge that there are other methods as well to
identify similarity, but for this work we use cosine similarity. With this method
we are able to identify 293 more suspect accounts that have similar behavior as
malicious accounts. When considering only EOAs, we identify best silhouette
score at k = 10 and 554 more suspects.
Assuming that K-Means with hyperparameter k = 9 identified for entire
dataset performs best for all temporal sub-datasets at different temporal gran-
ularities, we determine a probability for an account to be malicious at different
temporal granularities. Across all temporal granularities we identify 814 unique
accounts as suspects.
4 Feature Engineering
We do not describe the blockchain graph models as they are well understood.
Instead, we directly present features that we extract from the blockchain tem-
poral graph structure. The set of features (F ) defined in the related work is
limited and, in most cases, does not convey correct temporal behavior. We ex-
tend the feature set and introduce new features to detect malicious accounts.
We follow a two-fold methodology to identify the relevant features. First, we
study different attacks that have happened in the past to understand what fea-
tures malicious accounts have used for malicious activity. Second, as most of
the account features (for example, inDegree) are time series based, we perform
time series analysis to identify features that best represent the salient properties
of the relevant time series. Below we provide a list of all the features we use:
• Non Time Series based (set Fn|Fn ⊂ F)
– Active state (AS): malicious activities are usually short-lived [5] and re-
main, for example, until remediation is introduced. It is thus essential that
we consider features such as when the account first transacted (transact-
edFirst), last transacted (transactedLast), how long it has been active
(durationActive), and since when the account is continuously transacting
(activeSinceLast).
• Time Series based (set Ft|Ft ⊂ F): We analyze each of the following time
series based features using tsfresh [21, 22] and select 3 top features identified
for each of the following attributes. Nonetheless, as inter-event time (IET)
itself is a time series, we use it as a feature as well.
– inDegree (iD): it represents the number of transactions in which the
account under consideration is a receiver at a particular instant. Most of the
8
malicious activities involve transfer of money to a malicious account. Thus,
it is one of the most important features used to understand the behavior
of a malicious account. In [15], the author found that uniqueInDegree
(defined as unique accounts from which the account under consideration has
ever received money) to be one of the most critical feature for identification
of malicious accounts. On top, we also use aggregated inDegreeAgg as a
feature.
– outDegree (oD): represents the number of transactions in which the ac-
count under consideration has sent money at a particular instant. In some
attacks such as Bitpoint Hack [24], after the attacker has received amount
of sum from the victims in an alias account, they transferred the received
sum to another account they hold or to an exchange. Such attacks increase
the importance of outDegree as a potential feature. Similar to the case
above, we also use aggregated outDegreeAgg as a feature.
– Balance (Bal): our motivation to use it as a feature is based on the fact
that most malicious activities in a permissionless blockchains are finance
based. For example, in one of the famous Parity Multisig wallets [25] at-
tack the malicious account drained more than 150k Ethers (currency used
in Ethereum blockchain). Thus the currency held by an account as well as
its flow is an important feature. We identify balance time series for both
in/out case. Besides balance, we identify for each instance max balance for
both in and out cases (maxInBalance and maxOutBalance), zeroBal-
anceTransactions (transactions where no money was transferred either
to or from an account), totalBalance (final balance held with the account),
and averagePerInBalance (average of received balance) as features.
– Transaction Fees (TF): in crypto-currency based blockchains, a trans-
action is marked by transaction fees that a sender is willing to spend on
a particular transaction. In Ethereum blockchain, operations like transfer-
ring Ethers require a fixed sequence of instructions which consume 21,000
Gas (TF = Gas × GasPrice). Several attackers put higher gas price to
bribe the miner so that a particular transaction of interest to them is in-
cluded in the next block [19]. Nonetheless, in DDos attack [26], an attacker
created multiple accounts at very low gas price to increase synchronization
and processing time. Thus it is also an essential features.
– Attractiveness (A): mostly, malicious accounts tend to interact with
accounts that they have not interacted with before. The probability of
interacting with the same account that they have interacted before is very
low. Consider N ti to be the neighborhood (accounts with whom the account
i has received crypto-currency) of account i at time t, T = {t, t−1, · · · , t−
θa}, and θa the time window size. Based on this, we define attractiveness
(Ati) for account i at time t as shown in equation 1.
Ati =
1−
|Nti ⋂(⋃j∈T−{t}Nji )|
|⋃j∈T Nji | , when j ≥ 0 and N ti 6= ∅
0, otherwise.
(1)
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• Burst (BB) (set Fb|Fb ⊂ F): bursty behavior is defined as temporal non-
homogeneous sequence of events [27] and has been characterized by a fat-
tailed inter-event time (∆t) distribution. In one of the bitcoin blockchain
attacks (Allinvain Theft [28]), a malicious account generated a large number
of transactions to taint the bitcoin platform. Motivated by this incident, we
define four types of bursts (temporal, degree, balance and gasPrice) that occur
in the network under consideration. As an account can either be a sender or a
receiver, the following burst types are defined for cases (a) when the account
acts as a sender, (b) when the account acts as a receiver, and (c) when the
account acts as both a sender as well as a receiver.
– Temporal Burst : for an account i, non-homogeneous occurrences of
events (in our case transactions) lead to some transactions occurring where
∆t is less than a threshold, θit, while for other transactions ∆t is large. If
a transaction happens when ∆t < θit, we assume that it is a burst. Some
burst can be long lived while some burst can be short lived, meaning, some
event can happen continuously for long time intervals before going dormant.
As features, we identify number of such temporal bursts (numberOfTem-
poralBursts) and the duration of the longest burst (longestBurstDura-
tion) for both in and out transactions separately as well.
– Degree Burst : it has been proven that the degree (also inDegree and
outDegree) distribution of the aggregated transactions in blockchain such
as Ethereum follows a power-law (fat tailed) distribution [4] with α ∈
[−2.8,−2.6]. This suggests that many accounts do not transact often while
there are very few accounts that act as hubs (for example, exchanges).
Nonetheless, when considering the temporal aspects, we believe such be-
havior also exists where some accounts have a very high degree for some
instant while for other instants they have a low degree. Thus, we define a
degree burst when at a given instant of time the degree of an account, i, is
greater than θid. Similar to the temporal case, for degree bursts we also iden-
tify number of degree bursts (numberOfDegreeBursts) that happened
for an account over time, number of instances where the degree burst hap-
pened (numberOfDegreeBurstInstances), and the time at which the
largest burst of degree happened (largestBurstAt). Note that these fea-
tures except for numberOfDegreeBurstInstances are defined for both in and
out transactions separately as well.
– Balance Burst : in some cases transactions happen from accounts i to
account j where the involved sum of crypto-currency was very large (more
than a threshold value θib). For example, some accounts associated to Silk
Road [29] or involved in money laundering sometimes transact large sum for
illegal activities. Busty behavior of transaction amount could be helpful in
identifying potential malicious activities and accounts. Similar to the above
cases, for an account i, we identify number of unique instances where bal-
ance is more than θib (numberOfBalanceBurstyInstances), and num-
ber transactions more than θib (numberOfBalanceBursts). Note that,
we define these factors for both only in and out case.
10
– GasPrice Burst : As described before, an attacker can put higher gas
price (more than a threshold value θig) to bribe the miner so that the trans-
action is included in the block. This activity although abnormal is useful in
understanding account’s behavior. Towards this, similar to previous cases,
we define numberOfGasPriceBurstyInstances as number of instances
where the gasPrice was set more than θig. This is only defined for in case
as gasPrice is only set by the sender.
Note that features such as in/outDegree, burst, attractiveness are some
graph-based temporal features. Besides these features, other graph-based prop-
erties that we use as feature includes clustering-coefficient (CC) [30]. For
an account i, let N t,ini be the neighborhood of account i at time t from which
the account has received the crypto-currency, N t,outi be the neighborhood of ac-
count i at time t to which the account has paid the crypto-currency. Thus, the
total account degree is degtoti = |N t,ini | + |N t,outi |. Let N t,↔i = N t,ini
⋂
N t,outi
and air = 1 if there is a transaction between i and r, otherwise 0. We similarly
define ais, ari, asi, ars, asr. For a directed graph, CC of account i (CC
t
i ) at
time t is defined as equation 2 [31].
CCti =
∑
r
∑
s(air + ari)(ais + asi)(asr + ars)
2
[
degtoti (deg
tot
i − 1)− 2|N t,↔i |
] . (2)
5 Results and Evaluation
We evaluate the effectiveness of our method using Ethereum’s external transac-
tions data which is publicly available for download using the Etherscan APIs [32].
Note that the APIs do not provide any information about the account (such as
the name and the account type). Nonetheless, as the hash of the accounts is
available, one can check the associated information using the Ethereum Blockchain
Explorer [33]. We perform all our evaluations using Python.
5.1 Dataset
Ethereum as on 20th December 2019 had ≈79M accounts. Out of these ac-
counts, 3362 accounts were already tagged to be involved in malicious activi-
ties. The tags mainly include Phishing (3168 accounts), Gambling (8 accounts),
Cryptopia-Hack (6 accounts), Heist (16 accounts), Suspicious (4), Bitpoint Hack
(2 accounts), Compromised (21 accounts), Spam (10 accounts), Upbit-Hack (123
accounts), Unsafe (1 account), Scam (1 account) and Bugs (2 accounts). We
look for other sources such as Cryptoscam.db [34] as well to know the ground
truth about the accounts as some of the accounts might not be tagged as ma-
licious. As a result, we find 329 more malicious accounts with a total of 3691
unique malicious EOAs and SCs. Upon further investigation, we find that out
of these 3691 EOAs and SCs, 746 never transacted and were mostly involved in
the token trade until 7th December 2019. We thus remove them from our mali-
cious accounts dataset. In these remaining set of malicious accounts, there are
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(a) InDegree Distribution
(b) OutDegree Distribution
Figure 1: Degree Distribution of accounts.
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158 SCs and 2 marked compromised exchanges. Note that for these accounts we
collect only-but-all external transactions (transactions from EOAs to SCs, and
between different EOAs). Also note that at the time of this study Ethereum had
removed most of the malicious tags. But recently Ethereum provided new tags
and marked more accounts as malicious. As of 27th May 2020, there were 4708
malicious accounts out of which 2019 were newly tagged accounts. Out of these
2019 accounts only 1252 accounts ever transacted. Out of these 1252 accounts
1029 were created before 7th December 2019 in which only 3 are present in our
dataset. As the number of malicious accounts is constantly evolving, we take
this opportunity to cross validate accounts that our analysis found malicious.
There is a high class imbalance in the dataset as the number of benign ac-
counts is large. Thus, we perform random under-sampling to uniformly sample
697K benign accounts from the 79M Ethereum accounts. In the total ≈700K
accounts we have, there are 7 exchanges and 23,141 SCs while rest accounts are
EOAs.
A unique transaction, Tx, contains information about blockHash, block-
Number, source, destination, gas, gasPrice, Transaction hash, balance, and
timestamp of the block. Note that the Tx data does not include the timestamp
of when a transaction was performed by the account. The only time related
information, we are able to extract is the information about when a block is
mined. However, currently we do not use this information. We assume a time
bin of 1 block for our study. We assign respective blockNumber as a timestamp
to all the transactions1. Based on this notion of timestamp, we also segment the
data into several SD of different Tg and study the behavior of the accounts. We
describe in the section 1 the different Tgs we consider. For statistical purposes,
we have 1,531 Day SDs, 219 Week SDs, 52 Month SDs, 18 Quarter SDs, 9
HalfYearly SDs, 5 Year SDs, and the entire dataset. A total of 1835 datasets.
For our study we assign: (i) θt = 2 so that continuous burst of smallest
size are also captured, (ii) for an account i, θid = 0.8 × (max(d)) where d is
the in/outdegree of an account in the considered SD, (iii) θib = 0.8× (max(b))
where b is the transaction balance for either in or out case, (iv) θia to be equal to
the duration of the SD to keep the entire history of neighbors that a particular
account transacted in the past in the given that sub-dataset, and (v)) θig = 0.8×
(max(gasPrice)) where gasPrice is the the gas price for transactions associated
with account i. We then analyse different time series based features to identify
there characteristics as potential features.
5.2 Results
For the entire dataset, we first study inDegree and outDegree distribution for
both malicious and benign accounts to validate the fat-tailed behavior of the
degree distribution. From fig. 1, we identify that power-law distribution [35]
with xmin = 2.3, α ∈ [2.37, 2.54] and α ∈ [2.23, 2.33] fits inDegree and outDegree
distribution, respectively, for both malicious and benign accounts. Here α and
1The block numbers are continuous thus giving a notion of timestamp.
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(a) Temporal inDegree distribution for all accounts
(b) Temporal outDegree distribution for all accounts.
Figure 2: Temporal Degree Distribution of individual accounts.
xmin are the powerlaw exponent and minimum x from where the powerlaw
distribution is observed, respectively.
The fat-tailed nature of degree is evident because some accounts interact
with more number of accounts at a certain instant, thereby inducing a bursty
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behavior. We study the distribution of inDegree for all individual accounts
to understand if such behavior is shown by all the accounts. Fig. 2a presents
distribution of inDegree for different accounts. We identify that the inDegree of
very few accounts is high (>100) for very few time instances while most of the
time it is low suggesting the existence of bursts. We observe a similar behavior
for outDegree as well (see fig. 2b).
Next, we validate the existence of temporal bursts. For this we study the
distribution of inter-event time (∆t) for all accounts. We find that it follows
power law with xmin = 3 and α = 1.25 and α = 1.76 for benign and malicious
cases, respectively (see fig. 3a). Nonetheless, we also observe a truncation at
1.5 × 106 blocks. The truncation reflects that some accounts are inactive or
did not perform any transactions for long period of time. When looking at the
individual level, we observe that only few accounts have very large inter-event
time (> 1 × 106) where the probability of occurrence of such events is very
low. Most of the activity happens where the inter-event time is very small (see
fig. 3b).
The attractiveness behavior of malicious and benign accounts differ signifi-
cantly (see fig. 4). Most malicious accounts have high attractiveness value while
most of the benign accounts have low attractiveness value. This justifies our
assumption that most malicious accounts target those accounts that they have
not previously interacted with.Some attacks (Upbit Hack - Fake Phishing1431:
‘0xdf9191889649c442836ef55de5036a7b694115b6’) uses multiple accounts to evade
detection while transferring money to exchanges. They use multiple accounts
as buffer between account and exchange. This is the reason for relatively high
probability (p(A = 0) > 0.2) for the low values of attractiveness (A = 0) for
malicious accounts. Similarly for some benign accounts p(A = 1) = 0.1 because
such accounts only have 1 incoming transaction in whole lifetime portraying
account interacted only with new accounts.
For the entire dataset, after applying tsfresh, for every temporal feature
F jt ∈ Ft we get a set of features (Fˆ jt ) that describes F jt . From Fˆ jt , we choose
top three feature. We use Gini as the scoring method to identify the top three
feature. After this process, we get a total of 59 features. For the entire dataset,
using pearson correlation, we remove highly correlated features and find 36
important features. We also perform PCA to identify 28 features that cover
>98.2% variance to further reduce the feature space in the entire dataset.
For the analysis purposes, besides performing PCA to identify 28 features
and before running the AutoML tool (TPOT) to identify the best supervised
learning algorithm, we segment the entire dataset into six dataset configurations.
Note that these six dataset configurations are different from the temporal SDs.
Three out of these six dataset configurations use all types of accounts (EOA
and SC) and have 59, 36, and 28 features, respectively. While for the remaining
three, we separate EOAs from SCs and use only EOAs. These three configu-
rations again have 59, 36, and 28 features, respectively. We configure TPOT
with all the supervised ML algorithms used in the state of the art studies along
with other supervised ML algorithms to identify the algorithm that gives best
balanced accuracy.
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(a) Distribution of ∆t
(b) account-wise distribution of ∆t
Figure 3: Distribution of ∆t
Table 3 lists different dataset configurations we have used along with the
algorithm that provided the best balanced accuracy along with precision, recall
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Figure 4: Attractiveness
and F1-score for each class. For each dataset configuration and the algorithm
that provided the best balanced accuracy, we only provide values to those hy-
perparameters for which the values are different from the default case. We
identify that ExtraTreesClassifier provides overall best balanced accuracy for
all the dataset configurations and among them dataset with 59 features and
all the account types has best balanced accuracy. The difference in balanced
accuracy score between the dataset configurations when 36 and 59 features are
used is only 0.5% for both when we consider only EOAs and all the accounts,
respectively. Given such results, we show that correlated features do not provide
much gain and can be removed without the loss of accuracy.
To validate our results, we test ExtraTreesClassifier with identified hyper-
parameters on newly identified set of 1252 malicious accounts. The classifier
achieves 50% balanced accuracy. However, when we train the classifier with
identified hyperparameters on the total dataset (dataset consisting of previ-
ously used 700k accounts and new 1252 accounts), we were able to achieve
≈ 92% balanced accuracy. This makes us wonder if the new malicious nodes
have different characteristics. We check cosine similarity between the old 2946
malicious accounts and the new 1252 malicious accounts (cf. figure 5). We
find that most of the newly added malicious accounts had low similarity score.
Only one new malicious account had similarity score > 0.985 with only one old
malicious account. In many cases the similarity score even reached < −0.89
showing that the accounts are not similar and there are some new aspects used
by new malicious accounts. Note that to identify cosine similarity we do not
use features such as transactedlast and transactedF irst because many of the
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Figure 5: Cosine similarity between newly identified malicious accounts and old
malicious accounts.
accounts were created after 7th Dec 2019.
We next test unsupervised learning algorithms such as K-Means, DBSCAN,
HDBSCAN, and oneClassSVM to identify suspect accounts in the entire dataset.
We find that for the six dataset configurations (mentioned above and not the
SDs) and different values of k ∈ [3, 24], K-Means provide the best silhouette
score (score = 0.365) when k = 10 clusters and when we use all the features but
only EOAs (‘59 - EOA’) (see fig. 6). Among these 10 clusters, for one initial
condition, one cluster had the most number of already known malicious EOAs
(≈ 73.9% (2062/2788)) (see fig. 7). We then identify the similarity between all
the accounts in the identified cluster. We identify 554 benign accounts whose
behavior (cosine similarity) (see fig. 8) is within 1 −  where  → 0 to that of
malicious accounts. For our analysis we use  = 10−7. We cross validate the
transactions performed by these 554 benign accounts and find that (a) most
of the EOAs have small transactedLast value, meaning, those accounts never
transacted in recent past (in past 6 months 494 EOAs never interacted), (b)
atleast 38 EOAs only have incoming transactions and are not exchanges, and
(c) totalBalance ∈ [0.0, 150.0] Ethers with a median of 0.001 Ethers.
When considering both EOAs and SCs, we obtain the best silhouette score
(score = 0.356) for k = 9 clusters but for the case when we use all the 59 features
(‘59 - EOA and SC’) (see fig. 6). In this case, for one initial condition, there
was one cluster with a maximum number of already tagged malicious EOAs
(≈ 64.3% (1793/2788)) and malicious SCs (≈ 62.6% (99/158)). We identify
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TPOT
Features
Data identified Accuracy Precision Recall F1 score
Segment Classifier balanced Mal Ben Mal Ben Mal Ben
28 Only EOA ExtraTrees 0.872 0.38 1.00 0.75 0.99 0.50 1.00
(PCA) EOA and SC ExtraTrees 0.873 0.22 1.00 0.76 0.99 0.34 0.99
36
Only EOA ExtraTrees 0.876 0.11 1.00 0.78 0.97 0.19 0.99
EOA and SC ExtraTrees 0.882 0.24 1.00 0.78 0.99 0.37 0.99
59
Only EOA ExtraTrees 0.881 0.26 1.00 0.77 0.99 0.38 0.99
EOA and SC ExtraTrees 0.887 0.29 1.00 0.78 0.99 0.42 1.00
28 (PCA) EOA ExtraTreesClassifier(class weight = ‘balanced’, max features = 0.4, max samples = 0.3,
min samples leaf = 11, min samples split = 19, n estimators = 600)
28 (PCA) EOA and SC ExtraTreesClassifier(class weight = ‘balanced’, criterion = ’entropy’,
max features = 0.25, max samples = 0.15, min samples leaf = 13, min samples split = 4,
n estimators = 800, n jobs = 20, random state = 100)
36 EOA ExtraTreesClassifier(bootstrap = true, class weight = ‘balanced’, max features = 0.15,
max samples = 0.7, min samples leaf = 8, min samples split = 18, n estimators = 200, n jobs
= 10, random state = 100)
36 EOA and SC ExtraTreesClassifier(class weight = ‘balanced’, criterion = ’entropy’, max features =
0.45, max samples = 0.75, min samples leaf = 18, min samples split = 6, n estimators = 200)
59 EOA ExtraTreesClassifier(class weight = ‘balanced’, max features = 0.2, max samples = 0.75,
min samples leaf = 13, min samples split = 19)
59 EOA and SC ExtraTreesClassifier(class weight = ‘balanced’, criterion = ’entropy’, max features =
0.3, max samples = 0.3, min samples leaf = 14, min samples split = 20, n estimators = 200)
Table 3: Balanced accuracy, Precision, Recall and F1 score for both malicious
(Mal) and benign (Ben) accounts with best identified ML algorithm for super-
vised case when using different dataset configurations.
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Figure 6: Silhouette Scores for clusters identified by K-Means for different
dataset configurations and k ∈ [3, 24].
Figure 7: Clusters with number of malicious accounts for (a) when only EOAs
are considered, (b) when both EOAs and SCs are considered.
293 potential suspects EOAs and no suspect SCs within this cluster using our
previous method. Out of these 293 accounts, 160 EOAs were also detected
in the set of 554 accounts. We further tested if the accounts we identified as
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Figure 8: Cosine similarity between malicious accounts and benign accounts in
the cluster with best Silhouette score.
suspects are present in the list of newly tagged malicious accounts. We found
that none of the 3 new malicious tagged accounts that transacted during our
analysis period were not in our list of suspects. This is possible as the accounts
must have changed their behavior and become malicious after our collection
period. We do not reveal the account hash for the sake of privacy and not
maligning benign accounts in interacting with these either 554 or 293 suspects
until they are officially tagged malicious. Other unsupervised ML algorithms did
not perform better than K-Means. The range of silhouette scores for HDBSCAN
was ∈ [−0.06,−0.022] while oneClassSVM did not converge.
To further understand the temporal behavior changes before classifying the
accounts as malicious we use temporal sub-datasets (SDs) created at different
temporal granularities (Tg, see section 1). Consider a Tg ∈ TG which consists of
a several SDs. Let this set be set SD(Tg) where SD(Tg) = {SD(Tg)1, SD(Tg)2,
· · · , SD(Tg)j , · · · , SD(Tg)n}. Further, consider an account i. We first analyse
all the time-series based features in each SD(Tg)j and characterise them. We
employ a similar approach as before where we identify Fˆ it using tsfresh for a
F it ∈ F in a given SD(Tg)j and use three features in Fˆ it with highest gini score.
We then use K-Means with previously identified hyperparameter (k = 9) and
perform clustering. As before, we tag accounts in each SD(Tg)j as malicious
and benign after identifying cosine similarity. This results in a vector (M)
for each account of size ni where each element (Mj) in M is either 0 or 1
and ni is the number of SDs in a Tg in which the account appears. Here
0 represents not identified as malicious. Let this set of SDs be SD(Tg) =
{SD(Tg)i1, SD(Tg)i2, · · · , SD(Tg)ij , · · · , SD(Tg)in}. M depicts the behavior
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Figure 9: Probability distribution of number of changes in behavior of accounts
with certain probability for being benign at different Tgs.
of an account i where a change in behavior is captured if Mj 6= Mj+1. We note
that only one benign account, as per our analysis, has changed its behaviour
most number of times (591) in the Tg = Day. Figure 9 shows probability
distribution of number of changes in behavior performed by accounts. The
figure only considers those accounts where the change happened at least once.
For the daily case, as the data was significant we identify that lognormal-positive
distribution with parameters xmin = 1, µ = 1.25, and σ = 2.36 best fits the
data. Further, across all Tgs there were 9254 unique benign accounts that
showed unstable behavior.
From M , the probability of a particular account i to be malicious in a given
Tg is given by p
i
m =
∑
j∈SD(Tg)i Mj
ni
. Number of accounts with certain probability
for being benign at different Tgs is shown in figure 10. We identify 814 unique
accounts across different Tgs as suspects that have p
i
m = 0. Further, as seen
from the figure, most of the accounts accounts were identified as benign.
6 Conclusion
Growth of blockchains technology and concept has found its implementation
not only in the financial sector such as crypto-currency market, hedge-fund,
and insurance but also in sectors such as governance, education, healthcare,
and law enforcement. Although blockchains are privacy-preserving, with an in-
crease in its adoption, security threats are inevitable, more diverse, and deployed
using novel techniques. It is essential to have secure transactions. Motivated
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Figure 10: Number of accounts with certain probability for being benign at
different Tgs on a semi-log scale.
by the fact that there is limited work in identifying accounts involved in po-
tential malicious activities and those available do not target temporal aspects
of blockchains, in this work, we present a way to detect malicious accounts
considering the temporal nature of the blockchains.
In this work, we present graph-based temporal features (such as burst and
attractiveness) that are inspired by the existing attacks in the blockchain on
top of existing features used to identify malicious accounts. To do so, we first
conduct a systematic study of the temporal behavior of the blockchain graph on
a collected transaction data in one of the blockchains called Ethereum. Our re-
sults show that ExtraTreesClassifier performs best under the supervised setting
and achieves balanced accuracy ∈ [87.2, 88.7] for different dataset configurations.
Moreover, under the unsupervised settings, K-Means was able to cluster max
73.9% known malicious accounts together and identify 554 more suspects that
had similar behavior to that of malicious accounts. When considering behavioral
changes over time and studying them over different temporal granularities, we
are able to detect the probability of an account being malicious at a particular
temporal granularity.
Given such results, we expect that benign accounts would be more careful
while transacting with suspects and safe-guard themselves from any fraud and
security threats. Nonetheless, the current technique is applicable to permission-
less blockchain. We would like to investigate the applicability of our method
to blockchains where features such as Transaction Fees and Balance are miss-
ing. Despite whether a particular blockchain is permissionless or permissioned,
there are many other centrality measures such as closeness, betweenness and
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page-rank that are applicable in blockchain graph. One another future research
direction is to incorporate these measures as features and study the behavior of
the accounts before tagging them as malicious or benign. Nonetheless, in this
work, we detected suspects using supervised learning and unsupervised learning
algorithms. Reinforcement learning is another type of ML that can be applied
and studied to detect malicious activity. As our validations failed on the newly
tagged malicious accounts one perspective is to study new features and new
methods that the new malicious accounts are using and deploying to perform
illegal activities.
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